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ABSTRACT
The use of connected surgical robotics to automate medical pro-
cedures presents new privacy challenges. We argue that conven-
tional patient consent protocolswill no longer work. Indeed robots
that replace surgeons take on an extraordinary level of responsibil-
ity. Human surgeons undergo years of training and peer review in
an strongly regulated environment, and they derive trust via a pa-
tient’s faith in the hospital system beyond the surgeon him/herself.
Robots on the other hand derive trust not through the hospital sys-
tem they operate within, but the integrity of the software that gov-
erns their operation. From a privacy perspective, there are two fun-
damental shifts. First, the threat model has shifted from one where
the humans involved were untrusted to one where the robotic soft-
ware is untrusted. Second, the basic unit of privacy control is no
longer a medical record, but is replaced by four new basic units: the
subject onwhich the robot is taking action; the tools used by the ro-
bot and the valid form of tool usage; the sensors (i.e data) the robot
can access and the operations permitted over them; and, ﬁnally ac-
cess tomonitoring and calibration services which aﬀord correct op-
eration of the robot. We suggest that contextual privacy provides
useful theoretical tools to solve the privacy problems posed by
surgical robots. However, it also poses some challenges: not least
that the complexity of the contextual-privacy policies, if rigorously
speciﬁed to achieve veriﬁcation and enforceability, will be exceed-
ingly high to directly expose to human regulators/auditors/users
that review contextual privacy policies. Another key challenge, is
that contextual privacy accommodates information ﬂows but not
property. A medical robot works with both information and physi-
cal tissues and ﬂuid material. While informational norms allow for
judgements about contextual integrity and the transmission princi-
ple governs the constraints applied on information transfer, noth-
ing is said about material property. Certainly, contextual privacy
provides an anchor for useful notions of privacy in this scenario.
However, it appears the to solve the privacy challenges in the ﬁeld
of surgical robotics well, one needs to consider extending contex-
tual privacy to cover both information and material ﬂows.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern robotics has transformed a range of application areas, in-
cluding but not limited to surgical robotics, industrial robotics and
autonomous vehicles. The implementation of robotics in these ar-
eas brings forth the potential to increase the eﬃciency of output, as
well as the accuracy of operations amongst many other things. In
the case for surgical robotics, a high level of accuracy and precision
is key, which in a surgical environment could mean the diﬀerence
between life and death. Connected surgical robots, such as the da
Vinci surgical system [6], are increasingly playing a leading role
in carrying out teleoperated surgical procedures, including: per-
forming incisions, controlling blood loss, and bone milling, under
the oversight of human surgeons. Likewise, the majority of tele-
operated industrial robot architectures are comparatively similar
to teleoperated surgical robots [5]. Industrial robots accompany a
large portion of installed robotics systems, which range from aid-
ing in collection, packaging, and distribution of produce, to the
automotive industry.
Surgical robotics as a technology piece will have a transforma-
tive eﬀect on medical health and well being. However, its security
and privacy implications are yet to even be roughly ascertained. As
we start using connected robotics inmedical contexts, there will be
a few challenges.
Conventionally, patient privacy in the context of medical proce-
dures is based on the consent protocols that have evolved over the
centuries. These protocols are based on patient’s faith in the sys-
tem, to train surgeons to a high standard starting. Surgeons start
as apprentices and make their way through a systematic process
that retains patient trust, by placing patient well being at the cen-
tre of its focus. The question from a privacy consent perspective
is, can surgical robots deliver similarly well?
2 PRIVACY CHALLENGES IN SURGICAL
ROBOTICS
To answer the question at the end of the previous section, we can
start by examining how existing mechanisms of privacy control
would work if robots replace human surgeons. Our ﬁrst observa-
tion is that a robot does not simply replace a human surgeon, but
brings a new ecosystem of players into the ring. For instance, in
order to operate correctly, calibration data ﬂows from a National
Measurement Institute (such as NIST) via intermediate calibration
agencies, to the surgical robot located in a hospital. Such a step
would be necessary to ensure that the robots sensors are prop-
erly calibrated in advance of amedical procedure (information ﬂow
from a high-integrity source to low-integrity destination). The traf-
ﬁc around calibration activities is procedure dependent, and likely
to expose private information about the patient up the chain of
service providers who collectively provide an on-the-ﬂy calibra-
tion service. This is often required in the event of invalid calibra-
tion being detected during the surgical procedure, resulting in the
accuracy and precision being questioned, and to this we must per-
form on-the-ﬂy calibration. Beyond calibration, analytics and sys-
temmonitoring data ﬂows from the robot to themanufacturer, and
possibly the hospital’s insurer and the medical regulator who have
a stake in it operating correctly.
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clearly apply to this problem. Unfortunately, the conﬁdentiality-
and-privacy preserving mechanisms used to implement these no-
tions were developed when the granularity of control was at the
level of a single ﬁle. However, the granularity of control required
in a surgical robot for the purposes of calibration is not at the level
of a ﬁle read from a remote ﬁle system. What then is the basic unit
at which patient consent should be exercised?
Instead of considering patient consent over ﬁles/records, we need
to start thinking about patient consent over these newer basic units
of control. If data, services, operations, and most importantly the
subject themselves are not appropriately managed, then privacy
compromises will follow.We propose four types of basic units over
which privacy controls must be applied:
(1) Data: The sensors (and corresponding data) the robot can
access, and the operations permitted over them
• During a surgical procedure, some sensors would not be
required. For example, a temperature sensor would likely
not be required unless suturing was necessary in a pro-
cedure. Thus, access to this sensor should not be permit-
ted. Similarly, the data output from sensors should be con-
trolled, as it could leak information about the patient’s
condition.
(2) Services: Access to image-analysis-as-a-service, machine-
learning-as-a-service, among others. Additionally, monitor-
ing and calibration services which enable accurate and pre-
cise robot operations.
• We should restrict access to the monitoring services over
what they should be monitoring. For example, monitor-
ing who calibrates what robot should only be performed
at the same level as the calibration taking place, and read-
ing of logged monitoring data should be restricted to the
same level as calibration. Keeping these restrictions in
line across the calibration information ﬂow would aid in
avoiding leakage across levels. For example, information
about the speciﬁc procedure may leak via: the reference
data used for calibration, meta information about the cali-
brated devices, and the conﬂicts of interests raised by the
aggregation of meta calibration-information (at a calibra-
tion service provider who is servicing end-users in a situ-
ation of conﬂict).
(3) Subject: on which the robot is performing a procedure
• In the case for surgical robotics, the subject would be the
patient undergoing a surgical procedure which is carried
out solely by the robot, by a robot under human operation
or alongside a human (cobot). The subject is not data, in-
formation, a ﬁle, or a service; it’s the whole or part of a hu-
man or animal body. As an example, waste material from
a procedure can lead to privacy violations if they are la-
belled as non-humanwaste and subsequently be analysed
to violate patient privacy.
(4) Operations: The valid forms of tool usage in the context of
the procedure (surgical robots can often access an array of
tools using six to eight arms).
• If a surgical robot is performing a colonoscopy, it should
only allow equipment to be used relative to the procedure.
For example, a colonoscope (ﬂexible tube with CCD cam-
era attached) is an allowed tool, used to view the patient’s
colon. A scalpel in this case should not be allowed, as it
is unlikely that any incisions would be made in this pro-
cedure. Similarly, we must ensure that the colonoscope is
used properly, to minimise risk of abdominal distension
and rare cases of tears/bleeding.
We argue that patient consent protocols will see a signiﬁcant
change due to the introduction of surgical robotics. In compari-
son with human surgeons, there are two key diﬀerences: ﬁrst, the
untrusted party is the software running on the robot rather than
the human; and second, the conventional target of privacy protec-
tion is replaced by four distinct targets none of which is a ﬁle or
database record. With a change as fundamental as that it follows
that the conventional consent protocols and mechanisms face a re-
design. The next section explains how this might be done as an
application of contextual privacy.
3 CONTEXTUAL PRIVACY THEORY AND
SURGICAL ROBOTS
Clearly, in the context of surgical robotics, notice and consent will
not work. The dominant approach of delegation to a trustworthy
party (human surgeon) is also a moot suggestion. Therefore, can
contextual privacy theory provide the tools to solve this problem?
One suggestion within the community has been to replace consent
protocols with context-based privacy policies. We argue that this
would better reﬂect the values of keeping patient’s privacy and
dignity, as well as their well being at the centre of the connected
medical environment, rather than an economic view of data pro-
duction.
Contextual integrity [4] is a theory of privacy that links the pro-
tection of patient data to the norms of personal information ﬂow
within speciﬁc contexts. This theory argues that “informational
norms speciﬁc to particular contexts govern the ﬂow of personal
information from one entity to another”. Indeed the theory of con-
textual integrity provides a contextual framework for evaluating
the ﬂow of personal information between agents within the ecosys-
tem of surgical robotics to help identify and verify whether certain
patterns of information ﬂow are acceptable within the context of
the surgical procedure.
Within her conceptual framework, Nissenbaum [4] proposed
several principles of privacy. The ﬁrst principle says that privacy is
provided by appropriate information ﬂows. Let us examine whether
this is helpful in our context. In the calibration hierarchy, informa-
tion ﬂows from the top level NMIs to the robots at hospitals, situ-
ated at the lowest level. As described earlier, the integrity is highest
at the top level and lowest the bottom level. Thus, we should forbid
the hospital level towrite information to the top level. Likewise, we
deﬁne that the writing of information can only ﬂow downwards.
In terms of patient privacy, we should only allow the reading of
information to ﬂow upwards. If higher levels were granted access
to read information from the hospital level, this would leak infor-
mation about the robot’s calibration. In the case for on-the-ﬂy cal-
ibration, reading the information output from the calibration pro-
cess from on-the-ﬂy calibration for a speciﬁc surgical procedure
3would lead to leakage of information surrounding the surgical pro-
cedure. Similarly, combining this with patient admission and dis-
charge times, and other information would compromise the pri-
vacy of patients.
The second principle of contextual privacy is the development
of appropriate norms for enforcing privacy controls. By providing
norms, such as “a calibration engineer can only calibrate robots at
a single hospital, under conditions of strict conﬁdentiality, to avoid
leaking information to other hospitals”, we can evaluate hypothet-
ical scenarios to examine whether it violates contextual privacy.
We can supply many hypothetical cases to be evaluated against a
single norm. For example “Engineer X can calibrate robot A and
B at hospitals 1 and 2, respectively”, is clearly a violation of con-
textual integrity against the norm that a single engineer can only
calibrate robots at a single hospital.
3.1 Challenges in applying contextual privacy
theory
The challenge of managing the complexity of these contextual-
privacy policies and analysing them should not be underestimated.
It seems clear that expressing privacy policies in a way that rigor-
ously conveys the risks and beneﬁts to patients so as to be enforce-
able, in a veriﬁable manner, will be too technical to expose patients
to. Particularly as they are unlikely to fully grasp the details given
the context of their impending medical procedure. The average pa-
tient will likely fair poorly when assessing the impact of infection
risks, probabilities of life threatening complications, and compro-
mised or failedmedical procedures arising out of inadequate access
control of a patient’s internal organ. Most of us are simply too ig-
norant about our physical anatomy to make proper assessments
and instead rightly place our faith in the system of medical prac-
tice. Indeed, prospective surgeons undertake long years of study as
interns and apprentices, undergo frequent certiﬁcations, peer re-
view, experience regulation, and comply with a professional code.
Above all, patients trust is based on an expectation of a service
that promotes humanwelfare and well being from the surgical staﬀ
and large medical facilities. This faith in the system underpins ac-
cess control protocols that, albeit imperfect, have socially evolved
over several hundred years. In contrast, access control protocols on
robots must carry the collective weight of all these expectations.
Zimmer [7] describes norms of behaviour to vary dependent
on particular contexts. The norms can govern the ﬂow of patient
information in particular contexts, such as what type of informa-
tion as well as the quantity of information that is relevant to a
particular surgical procedure. Informational norms consist of three
agents that are relevant to our case: the information subject, stor-
age and distributor of information, and the information receiver. In
the case for surgical robotswhich interact with vulnerable patients,
the agents vary upon context. For example, in a surgery involving
a teleoperated robot, one surgical command (i.e. rotating the actu-
ator by 5 degrees) can involve more than one instance of an agent.
A surgeon would distribute the command to the robot, who in turn
may record this command in a cache to be later stored, ormay send
it to a logging system to be recorded. Similarly, the information
subjects would include the robot and surgeon, as well as the pa-
tient being operated on. Thus, we also question whether deﬁning
a policy for a single robot movement would become too complex
for a patient to understand. We can argue that we can deﬁne poli-
cies to cover an entire surgical procedure, however with many in-
formational norms being evaluated that may consist of more than
one instance of an agent, the patient may ﬁnd it far too complex
to interpret.
Given that that expressing consent-based privacy policies in a
way that is rigorous enough to make them veriﬁable and enforce-
able is going to be too technical to expose end users to directly. This
suggests that there is going to be a role for expert review of poli-
cies. It also suggests that delegation to experts needs to be done to
a standard that retains the faith that patients have conventionally
placed in human surgeons. A complimentary approach is the de-
velopment of appropriate formal analysis to mitigate the complex-
ity. While veriﬁcation techniques based on formal methods might
help, we believe a complete solution must involve experts to pro-
vide some level of governance over these new forms of privacy
controls in connected medical environments.
The surgical robot is a human facing cyber-physical system, so
it doesn’t just work with information, it also works with physical
objects – body parts and human tissue. Privacy constraints must
therefore be applied not just over information ﬂows but also the
physical material the robot is handling. From a consent perspec-
tive, in English and Scottish Law, tissue removed during a surgical
procedure with due consent is considered “abandoned” by the pa-
tient and can legally be used for research purposes (Human Tissue
Act 2004). However, activities such as clinical audit, performance
assessments, and quality assurance require further explicit consent.
A partially compromised surgical robot could potentially mislabel
human tissue collected after a procedure as research tissue. Instead
of being incenerated, when such tissue is stored and subjected to
unauthorised commercial exploitation or analysis then privacy vi-
olations will potentially occur (in abundance). The main point we
are making here is that privacy considerations apply not just to
information (data and services), but to physical “property” as well.
And, therein lies a basic challenge with applying any information-
centric privacy framework, including contextual privacy, to the
problem domain of surgical robotics.
3.2 Applying Contextual Privacy to Policies
As previously described,managing the complexity of applying con-
textual privacy to policies for evaluation, whilst ensuring that they
can be expressed rigorously in a way to not be exposed too techni-
cally to patients, is a challenge. The categorisation of informational
norms may vary, from virtually variation to being completely dif-
ferent, dependent on the context. For example, deﬁned informa-
tional norms for a minimally invasive procedure would vary a fair
amount in comparison to a fully invasive procedure.
To understand the complexity of applying contextual privacy
for policies, ideally, we should evaluate patient experiences with
understanding surgical procedures from talkingwith their doctors/-
surgeons. These can then be formulated into the appropriate norms
for speciﬁc surgical contexts, and then be applied to a standard
which retains conventional patient-surgeon faith. However, with
the option currently unavailable, we can deﬁne realistic example
constructs to examine such a complexity, as shown in Table 1.
4Context Sender & Receiver Transmission Principle Example Norm(s)
Initial Calibration Manufacturer – receives meta-
information about the surgical procedure
via monitoring information about wear-
and-tear status of all stepper motors,
arms, and sensors.
Calibration agencies and NMIs – receive
meta-information about the procedure via
relevant sensors used in the procedure.
Information divulged tomanufacturer and
calibration agencies organically by the
process of maintaining high physical in-
tegrity and the accuracy of sensors.
Robot components must have valid and
veriﬁed calibration, to ensure a high de-
gree of accuracy and precision.
On-the-Fly Calibration Calibration Facilities – notify subsequent
levels up to the robot’s components of in-
valid calibration at a particular level in the
calibration hierarchy.
Surgeon – informed of invalid calibration
during surgery and should make a call for
on-the-ﬂy calibration, dependent on the
context, to minimise risk to the patient.
Information ﬂows from the top level of the
calibration hierarchy (NMIs) towards the
hospital in a series of ﬁrst-hop events. If
invalid calibrationwas detected at an NMI,
they would inform the ﬁrst subsequent
units at the next level, and so forth until
the surgical robots at the hospital level.
During a surgical procedure, surgical
robots must retain valid calibration to
maintain a high degree of accuracy and
precision. If the calibration is deemed in-
valid, the robot must be recalibrated on-
the-ﬂy.
Community (Group) Calibration Calibrator – wants to calibrate a robot
component.
Robot – neighbouring components in the
robot system will form a group decision to
permit/deny calibration.
Neighbouring components will use a form
of signalling, possibly through a bus link
between them (CAN), to make decisions
with other components.
To avoid constant recalibration requests,
which can leak sensitive information
about the robot operations and its calibra-
tion (and possibly the patient), other com-
ponents must learn to make consensus de-
cisions to authorise recalibration.
Teleoperated Surgical Procedures Surgeon – sends commands/movements
via a surgeon’s console to the robot.
Robot – receives commands from the sur-
geon’s console.
Commands will be transmitted via hard-
ware cable between the surgeon’s console
and the robot or in some cases, wirelessly.
The robot will only accept incoming com-
mands from the surgeon’s console, in
either transmission case, and no other
sender.
Autonomous Surgical Procedures Robot – receives data from a reliably
trained and trustworthy learning mecha-
nism, to make decisions on movements
and operations to perform.
Robot – sends movements and commands
to embedded controller to move the robot.
The robot will receive data and send com-
mands through its internal network, such
as via a controller area network (CAN) [1].
(1) The robot should only accept data in-
put from a veriﬁed classiﬁer that is
not prone to leaking information [2,
3].
(2) The learning mechanism to provide
data input should be trained and
tested from reliable sources (i.e. a hu-
man surgeon).
Table 1: Table of Norms for Estimating Complexity
It is clear that we can deﬁne norms to express contextual pri-
vacy in a way that can be easily understood by patients. Trust can
be inferred by having a surgeon’s input for training autonomous
surgical robots, as well deﬁning normswhich can envelop patient’s
trust by ensuring reliable calibration leading to maintained robot
accuracy. However, for each of the 5 contexts we present norms
for, there can be many diﬀerent norms that can cover all aspects
relevant to the context. As well as this, from a point of evaluation,
discussing contexts and norms with real surgeons and calibration
agencies would provide more in-depth details that we can not sim-
ply provide examples for. We show that the complexity can be min-
imised using the norms as shown in Table 1, but a more in-depth
evaluation of these with input from hospitals and calibration agen-
cies will allow us to further examine howwe canmanage complex-
ity and privacy for real case examples.
4 CONCLUSION
Contextual privacy theory provided a useful conceptual framework
within which to situate privacy policies for surgical robots. It also
presented three challenges. The main challenge was of expressing
policies that were rigorous enough to be veriﬁable, and yet sim-
ple enough to be understood by patients. A further basic challenge
was that information ﬂow constraints have traditionally been ex-
pressed where the level of control is a ﬁle, however with surgical
robots we have four diﬀerent basic units of control: the subject, op-
erational tool set, data, and services. The ﬁnal challenge we faced
was how to deal with physical material (human tissue), using a
consent framework designed to constrain information ﬂows. We
don’t expect any easy solutions to these challenges.
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